Theoretical progress, as envisioned within the discipline of social psychology, is slow to arrive (Gergen 1982; Meehl 1978; Scriven 1964) . Investigators committed to the experimental method, the method often deemed most powerful of all, account for this by referring to the complexity of the subject matter; others point a finger at the experimentalists' methodological commitment itself (Allport 1961; Giorgi 1970; Harr6 and Secord 1972) . Perhaps both sides are right. In any case, people beset by the large and small perplexities of life rarely turn to academic psychology for answers. Instead, they seek clarification from experts, from the humanities, from admired models and occasionally from the lessons gleaned in their own life histories. It (Silverman 1977) . Further, even our laboratory-derived knowledge exhibits little of the cumulative character we associate with the scientific method (Katz 1967 ) and without such reliability and continuity in the laboratory there can be no confident generalization beyond it (Meehl 1978) .
Despite mounting criticism, laboratory investigations have continued to grow in esteem and occupy more and more of our journal space. At the heart of social-psychological experimentation lies the pursuit of operational definitions. Bridgman's operationalist philosophy could hardly have shaped the course of psychological research more thoroughly or enduringly (Bridgman 1927) . Although the premisses on which this philosophy rests have been powerfully challenged by philosophers of science, nothing seems to avail against this anachronism (cf. Hanson 1973; Hempel 1966; Kuhn 1962; Suppe 1977; and many others) . One may well wonder why. A main objective of this paper is to explore the incentives of a scientific strategy which delivers a scanty theoretical yield and which lacks firm philosophical supports. The premiss underlying the present discussion is that, whereas operationism can be criticized (or defended) on logical grounds, its persistence in the face of methodological critique and of its disappointing theoretical yield cannot. We must seek answers outside the philosophy of science, for instance, in the sociology of professions and in the explicit and implicit missions which learned disciplines set for themselves (Leahy 1980) .
The philosophical critique of operationism has led to a rejection of the notion that theoretically neutral measurement observations can be gradually refined and take their place in a theoretical edifice. Theoretical and operational refinement go hand in hand, and there are no theory-free operations. A host of other difficulties have been recognized as well. But these criticisms have been largely without effect. Perhaps experimenters are not impressed by philosophical rebuttals. My purpose in this paper is neither to add yet another theoretical refutation nor to offer an alternative methodological programme. Methodological innovations can be only partly relevant and will probably not be widely accepted until the larger framework-the incentives and tacit hopes supporting the discipline in its current form-is examined and modified. I shall argue that the discipline of experimental social psychology is rclled by an unacknowledged, historically specific social-psychological imperative and that 'broadening' its methodological approaches in the manner suggested by a host ofreformers will not suffice to rescue itfrom its peculiar predicament.
To make this argument plausible and to point an approximate way out of the predicament, a particular difficulty encountered by operationalist social psychology must be made clear in a manner somewhat neglected in the critical literature. The difficulty concerns the role of pretheoretical knowledge in the progress of social-psychological science. It is important to be clear about this and to see it as something more than a handicap for operationism; it reveals something about the subject matter of social psychology and eventually about the extrascientific incentives guiding the discipline. To accomplish this clarification I rely on the case-study method, drawing on excerpts from one voluminous research literature. Since what stimulates a new study is usually the critical evaluation or reinterpretation of a previous study, attention will focus on these evaluations. I therefore begin with an 'inside view', a study of how adherence to the operationalist principle influences the actual progress of research on a theoretical problem and what specific difficulties it involves. This will lead to an exploration of the extrascientific incentives which sustain operationism in social psychology. Viewing the field in its societal context may be judged helpful if it accounts for the general persistence in a relatively unproductive scientific strategy and if it contributes to a more receptive climate for non-operationist approaches. This is, however, a matter of historical processes, and I shall refrain from making specific proposals or predictions.
To comprehend the persistence of operationism, it is well to keep the attractions of the laboratory in mind-especially by contrast with the helter-skelter social world on which experimental findings are intended to shed light. These attractions consist of a constant, standardized stimulus field, the regulated manipulation of selected independent variables, and the simplification and objectification of dependent variables. These conditions are placed in the service of shedding light on certain complex and unruly phenomena occurring in 'real life' . For the findings to be generalizable, the laboratory conditions should be relatively unambiguous empirical realizations of theoretical variables encumbered by minimal situational artifacts. Most experimenters believe that theoretical progress (in any scientific field) depends on the development of relatively robust, all-purpose laboratory operations. It is a common observation, however, that many of these operations in human psychology have been nearly as complex and ambiguous as the original real-life phenomena which they were meant to illuminate. This difficulty is widely recognized in the literature but has not been adequately explored in regard to its limits. Proposed solutions have accordingly seemed utopian and remained largely ignored, for instance, Aronson and Carlsmith's discussion of 'purification' (1968, pp. 15-16) or balanced replications (p. 21).
To put it simply, the concept of generalizability is not adequate to the problem. ' Real life' is the stimulus to research as well as its proving ground. It therefore makes a difference whether we speak of findings generalizing from one laboratory setting to another or to 'real life'. The logical distinctions between reliability and validity or between construct and external validity do not adequately reflect the fact that the previous study stood in the same dual relation to 'real life' (as both its stimulus and proving ground) as the present study which is supposed to improve on it. Finally, the distinction between stimulus and proving ground is itself unsatisfactory because it obliterates the decisive fact that the psychologist represents and exemplifies the inhabitants of the 'real world'-the object of theory-while he is at the same time the ruler of the laboratory which is supposed to give us a handle on that world-the subject of theory. I call this fact decisive because it sets up a specific tension in the practitioners of the discipline which is rarely discussed except in strictly methodological terms. This too will be taken up in the case study and subsequently discussed as to its broader significance.
For (Eagly and Himmelfarb 1978, p. 532) , and yet the discouraging verdict after years of intensive research was that 'the distribution of dissonance, neutral, and [contradictory] effects obeys a normal curve' (Sears and Abeles, 1969, pp. 265-66 (1957, pp. 262-66) . He also entertained a number of astute typological hypotheses regarding which little evidence has become available (1957, pp. 266-75) . The ratio of effort to progress in dealing with these questions has been disappointing (cf. Meehl 1978 (Fazio, Zanna and Cooper 1977 (Festinger 1957, p. vii (Brehm and Cohen 1962, p. 74) .On the strength of this 'definition of the situation'--so ran the critique-the high-reward subjects would come to think of the task as all the more unpleasant, and this, rather than the alleged CD effect in the low-reward group, accounted for the difference between the groups. In other words, the critics held that because the laboratory operation had an unintended side effect, the theory had not been tested at all.
To set matters right, Cohen carried out an experiment similar to the Festinger and Carlsmith study, but using a larger range of inducements and including smaller values. Yale undergraduates were paid ten dollars, five dollars, one dollar or fifty cents to write an essay favouring the intervention of the police in a recent student riot. Cohen found that subjects who had been paid fifty cents showed greater attitude change in the direction of the advocated opinion than did subjects who had been paid one dollar. This study was intended to dispose of the twenty dollar problem. Cohen concluded that the dissonance hypothesis was confirmed because his study was free from this defect: 'No more suspicion can be attached to a $1 offer than to a 50g offer', he wrote (Cohen 1962, p. 77) .
Although this study supposedly rehabilitated the theory, Rosenberg soon published an article in which he criticized both of the previous studies. He speculated that subjects might have interpreted Cohen's offer of money as a bribe, as an attempt to test whether their fierce anti-police attitudes would remain steadfast or whether they could be bought off. This would engender suspicion and anger. As a result the subjects would demonstrate their autonomy by holding fast to their anti-police attitudes, hoping to frustrate the experimenter at the same time (Rosenberg 1965) .
To remedy this fault, Rosenberg carried out a study in which the subjects were led to believe they were participating in two unrelated experiments. Presumably this procedure would eliminate the disturbing artifacts in Cohen's study. The results contradicted the CD hypothesis.
However, it was not long until Rosenberg's study was in turn dismissed on various grounds (Aronson 1966; Brehm 1965 (2) Untested Assumptions The insights on which these critiques rest are not derived from scientific investigations; rather they are in need of testing. In this sense, they are subjective. But subjective is not idiosyncratic. We may surmise that overpaying someone will make him suspicious. We do not know it in any systematic way (yet). But it seems plausible to anyone experienced in human affairs, and plausibility is sufficient to undermine our faith in certain laboratory findings. McGuire (1976) and Gergen (1982) recognize this point fully. Cook and Campbell (1979) acknowledge it as well, though without its full implications, in their distinction between 'internal' and 'construct' validity.
Pretheoretical assumptions complicate the evaluation of findings in other sciences as well. They constitute a 'supporting chorus of background beliefs' (Quine and Ullian 1970, p. 68) . For this reason, it is held by many that crucial experiments cannot be carried out, that a corroborated hypothesis has merely withstood a challenge, and that a falsified one need not be discarded (Greenwald 1975; Greenwald and Ronis 1981 (Leahey 1980 In the traditional view, life settings and laboratory settings are regarded as two distinct and independent realms. The same laws govern the events and processes taking place in each. Yet it is thought possible to arrange conditions in the laboratory which are as discontinuous from those outside as is necessary for a particular investigation. Aronson and Carlsmith distinguish two kinds of realism. They speak of experimental realism when a laboratory procedure has an impact on subjects, involves them and forces them to take it seriously. They speak of mundane realism when the events in the laboratory are judged as likely to occur in the real world (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968) . According to these authors, an operation can have an impact even though it is not representative of reality. For instance, the Asch situation, which makes subjects 'squirm, sweat, and exhibit other signs of tension and anxiety', is said to be mundanely unrealistic; after all, 'it is rare to find oneself in a situation where the direct and unambiguous evidence of one's senses is contradicted by the unanimous judgements of one's peers' (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968, p. 22 (Chapanis and Chapanis 1964) . This ambiguity is not accidental; arousal and embarrassment are 'naturally' correlated. Earlier we saw that money can serve as a reward because subjects are already familiar with its value. But that same prior familiarity has also given rise to expectations regarding the fairness and credibility of specific remunerations. Thus, money 'naturally' combines the reward function, which the experimenter intends, with a credibility factor, which may act as a contaminant. The search for the perfect lever dooms our prospects for determinacy. The lever must fit the object of mastery but as it comes to resemble it too closely, it breaks under its own weight.
To speak of 'natural correlation' and of 'infiltrating meanings' is to specify a particular kind of relatedness. A contrast will make this clear. In another context, Bronfenbrenner has proposed an approach to ecological validity in which organismic development will be studied as a function of the 'interdependent, nested systems' in which it occurs (Bronfenbrenner 1977, p. 517 (Berelson 1952) and in historical research, where events and documents are often taken out of the context of opinion and belief which endows them with significance (Gottschalk 1947 (Cicourel 1964 (Cicourel , 1981 . At least one theory of society holds that the impetus for social development comes from the evolving learning potential and competence of the society's socialized members (Habermas 1981 ). Thus, the occlusions of the micro-level and of micro-macro interactions have a political as well as epistemic significance. Operationism undoubtedly contributes to this larger impasse by foreshortening our perspective on subjective processes.
These prevalent paradoxical dynamics of social research can be viewed in concentrated form in the social psychology laboratory. I have argued that perplexing phenomena command our attention and energy because they gravely complicate our lives. Gaining leverage over them is a powerful inducement to their scientific study. To this end we create social situations in the laboratory which turn out to be quite as complex as those outside. We can perhaps control the arrangements, but never the interpretations which subjects (and readers) place on them. The resulting objective and subjective ambiguities are rarely resolved and thwart our search for the magic lever at least in regard to perplexing phenomena. Prescientific knowledge impedes us even as it stimulates and guides us. If this is so, then, ironically, scientific progress may encounter the fewest such obstacles in domains in which we have no 'headstart' of sophistication because they hold no real-life interest for us. By contrast, we may expect that whenever we bring a phenomenon into the laboratory which is perplexing in real life, the same mundane relevance which acts as an incentive to our inquiry will also defeat us.
Finally, we consider once more the mesmeric belief that the laboratory can be isolated from 'real life' and that we can develop instruments and insights within it which will later find application in our perplexing social world. Is this not a belief growing out of the distinction between an inner, symbolic (and innocent) world and an outer, real (and problematic) one, out of the opposition of a rational mind and a scourged, impure body? Surely the problem runs deeper than method. The discipline of social psychology has placed itself in a bind by adhering to this dualism from which the polishing of methods and research designs cannot free us. That is why it would be self-contradictory and hasty to propose superior approaches at this point. New methods can in time be developed out of a non-dualistic reconceptualization of socialpsychological research, that is, after the relinquishment of the leverage illusion. An interpretive discipline seems most promising (Taylor 1979) . 1 shall show elsewhere what this means in practice (Rosenwald 1985) .
The scientific strategy currently being pursued suffers from the same problems as the social world it seeks to study. Operationism reflects as well as perpetuates a socially created, not an ontological, duality-the sundering of the individual (investigator) into social atom and irrepressible subject. As the former, he makes compromises for Science; as the latter he knows better and protests. To address this enforced duality requires that the search for knowledge become identical with its application, that research become a factor in resocialization. Seemingly, nothing short of a revision of the self-concept of the social sciences will do. Having traced the sources of the current strategy to the social order, we can understand better why methodological exhortations do not work. At the same time, this intransigence reveals the sheer power of perplexing socialization: to cut through the Gordian knot, we have set our hopes and tightened our grip on one of the dullest blades available.
